In this post we’re going to focus on some ADFS internals. We’ll be looking at OAuth2, and how it underpins the analogues to Entra ID security features like Device Registration and Primary Refresh Tokens.
Read More »
Originally presented at SOCON-2024, and continuing the series into post-exploitation techniques against Identity Providers, in this blog post we'll look at Ping, OneLogin and Entra ID. I'll discuss how post-exploitation techniques effective against Okta apply to other providers, release new tools for post-exploitation, and look at what proves to be effective when critical assets lie beyond an Identity Provider portal.
Read More »
While looking for avenues of injecting code into platform binaries back in macOS Monterey, I was able to identify a vulnerability which allowed the hijacking of Apple application entitlements. Recently I decided to revisit this vulnerability after a long time of trying to have it patched, and was surprised to see that it still works. There are some caveats introduced with later versions of macOS which we will explore, but in this post we’ll look at a vulnerability in macOS Sonoma which has been around for a long time, and remains an 0day, urm, to this day.
Read More »
In this blog post, I'll discuss some of the post-exploitation techniques that I've found to be useful against Okta. Specifically, this post will look at how to use delegated authentication to our advantage, silver tickets, Okta AD agent spoofing, and finally how to deploy a fake SAML provider.
Read More »
This year, LAPS 2.0 was released by Microsoft, and thankfully it now comes built-in to Windows. This time it comes ready for use with Active Directory, as well as being supported in Azure AD aka Entra ID. In this post, we’ll look at how LAPS 2.0 for Active Directory works under the hood, so you can make those fresh recommendations to your clients, and prepare yourself for the inevitable question... “But we just deployed LAPS.. what does LAPS 2.0 do differently?!”.
Read More »